SC A LIA, J.: Under long-standing precedent of the National

SCALIA, J.: Under long-standing precedent of the National Labor relations Board, an employer who behaves that an mcumbent union no longer enjoys the. support of a majority of its employees has three options: to request a formal, Board-supervised election, to withdraw recognition from the union and refuse to bargain, or to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The Board has held that the latter two are unfair labor practices unless the employer can show that it had a “good faith reasonable doubt” about the union's majority support. We must decide why _ ether the Board's standard for employer polling is rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations Act, and whether the Board's factual determinations in this case are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mack Trucks, Inc., had a factory branch in Allentown, Pennsylvania, whose service and parts employees were represented by Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work­ AFL-CIO. Mack notified its Allentown managers m May of 1990 that it intended to sell the branch and several of those managers formed Allentown Mack Sales, Inc., the petitioner here, which purchased the assets of the business on December 20, 1990, and began to operate it as an independent dealership. From December 21, 1990, to January 1, 1991, Allentown hired 32 of the original 45 Mack employees. During the period before and immediately after the sale, a number of Mack employees made statements to the prospective owners of Allentown Mack Sales suggesting that the incumbent union had lost support among employees in the bargaining unit. In job interviews, eight employees made statements indicating, or at least arguably indicating, that they personally no longer supported the union. In addition, Ron Mohr, a member of the union's bargaining committee and shop steward for the Mack Trucks service department, told an Allentown manager that it was his feeling that the employees did not want a union, and that “with a new company, if a vote was taken, the Union would lose.” And Kermit Bloch, who worked for Mack Trucks as a mechanic on the night shift, told a manager that the entire night shift (then 5 or 6 employees) did not want the union. On January 2, 1991, Local Lodge 724 asked Allentown Mack Sales to recognize it as the employees' collective-bargaining representative, and to begin negotiations for a contract. The new employer rejected that request by letter dated January 25, claiming a “good faith doubt as to support of the Union among the employees.” The letter also announced that Allentown had “arranged for an independent poll by secret ballot of its hourly employees to be conducted under guidelines prescribed by the National Labor Relations Board.” The poll, supervised by a Roman Catholic priest, was conducted on February 8, 1991; the union lost 19 to 13. Shortly thereafter, the union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the Board. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Allentown was a successor employer to Mack Trucks, Inc., and therefore inherited Mack's bargaining obligation and a presumption of continuing majority support for the union. The ALJ held that Allentown's poll … violated§§ 8(a)(1) and 8 (a)(5} of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) because Allen­ town dtd not have an “objective reasonable doubt” about the majority status of the union. The Board a. dopted the ALJ's findings, … agreed with his conclusion, ·. [and] ordered Allentown to recognize and bar gam with Local 724. On review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Allentown challenged both the acta! rationality of the Board's test for employer poll mg and the Board's application of that standard to the facts of this case. The court enforced the Board's Bagram mg order …. We granted certiorari. Allentown challenges the Board's decision in this case on several grounds. First, it contends that because the Board's “reasonable doubt” standard for employer polls tsp. the same as its standard for unilateral withdrawal of recognition and for employer initiation of a Board-supervised election (a so-called “Representation Management,” or “RM” election), the Board irrationally permits employers to poll only when it would be unnecessary and legally pointless to do so. Second, Allentown argues that the record evidence clearly demonstrates that it had a good-faith reasonable doubt about the union's claim to majority support. Finally, it asserts that the Board has abandoned the “reasonable doubt” prong of its polling standard, and recognizes an employer's “reasonable doubt” only if a majority of the unit employees renounce the union …. Allentown argues that it is irrational to require the same factual showing to justify a poll as to justify an outright withdrawal of recognition, because that leaves the employer with no legal incentive to poll. Under the Board's framework, the results of a poll can never supply an otherwise lacking “good-faith reasonable doubt” necessary to justify a withdrawal of recognition, since the employer must already have that same reasonable doubt before he is permitted to conduct a poll. … While the Board's adoption of a unitary standard for polling, RM elections, and withdrawals of recognition is in some respects a puzzling policy, we do not find it so irrational as to be “arbitrary [or] capacious” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Board believes that employer polling is potentially “disruptive” to established bargaining relationships and “unsettling” to employees, and so has chosen to limit severely the circumstances under which it may be conducted. The unitary star? dard reflects the Board's apparent conclusion that poll mg should be tolerated only when the employer might other stmply withdraw recognition and refuse to bargam. · · · If it would be rational for the Board to set the polling standard either higher or lower than the threshold for an RM election, then surely it is not trratwnal for the Board to split the difference. The Board held Allentown guilty of an unfair labor practice in its conduct of the polling because it had not demonstrated that it held a reasonable do bt, based on objective considerations, that the Unwn continued to enjoy the support of a maJOnty of the bargaining unit employees. We must decide w?ether that conclusion is supported by substantial evtdence on the record as a whole. Put differently, we must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board's conclusion …. [The Court reviewed the facts and determined that the evidence supported the petitioner's doubt that the majority of its employees supported the union.] We conclude that the Board's “reasonable doubt” test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the Act. But the Board's factual finding that Allentown Mack Sales lacked such a doubt is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny enforcement.
1. What event occurred that allowed the representation of employees by a union to be called into question?
2. What were the findings and order by the NLRB?
3. What issues were presented to the Supreme Court?
4. Why does the Court agree with the NLRB about a unitary standard of “reasonable doubt” for refusing to bargain, polling employees, and requesting a decertification election?
5. How does the Court differ with the NLRB in this case? 6. Do you agree with the Court analyses and conclusions?